Crisis Situations, Counter terrorism and Derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights. A Threat Analysis by Loof, J.P.
In: Antoine Buyse (ed.), Margins 0' Conflict. The ECHR and 
Transitions to and I'rom Armed Conflict (Series on Transnational 
Justice, no. 5), Antwerp-Cambridge-Portland: Intersentia 2010. 
CRISIS SITUATIONS, COUNTER 
TERRORISM AND DEROGATION 
FROM THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
A Threat Analysis 
Jan-Peter Loop* 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE SUBJECT OF THIS CONTRIBUTION FROM A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The one provision in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) most 
explicitly focusing on crisis situations is Article 15. This Article provides for the 
derogation of certain Convention rights during times of war or other public 
emergency. In this contribution the way the European Court of Human Rights is 
supervising the use of this derogation clause by the Contracting States is 
analyzed. How did the Court interpret the separate provisions of this Article? 
Which level of scrutiny did it apply? And, does this interpretation and level of 
scrutiny affect the European human rights protection in the post-9/11 era? 
From time immemorial governments have tried to come to an organized 
response to crises, political violence or acts of terrorism in the form of emergency 
rules or the implementation of a state of emergency. The solution has often been 
found in assigning special powers to the (head of the) Executive, in appointing a 
special official to cope with the emergency situation (e.g. the Roman dictatorship) 
or in transferring civil powers to military authorities (e.g. the British martial law 
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and the French etat de siege).! History shows that from the earliest development 
of emergency regimes, these regimes provide for the infringement of the rights 
and freedoms of citizens: at first mainly the infringement of property rights and 
the deviation from the normal system of justice, later also the infringement of 
other rights. Actually, the manner in which the dictatorship in the Roman 
Republic was organized has long been taken as an example of a good set of rules 
for states of emergency. This is because of its fairly strictly formalized, controlled 
and time-limited nature which preserved, as much as possible, both the return to 
ordinary governmental structures and the liberty of individuals. This 
appreciation for the Roman dictatorship has also influenced the way in which 
the derogation clauses in post-World War II constitutions and in human rights 
treaties like the ECHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR, which contains a derogation clause in Article 4) have been 
structured and interpreted.2 
The legal literature on states of emergency and other crisis situations offers 
ample evidence that 'public emergencies' and 'unprecedented threats' have 
frequently been called on in the past to justify human rights violations; that 
'temporary' measures to fight crisis situations have often developed into 
permanent ones; and that it is extremely difficult to re-institute human rights 
protections once lost.3 Another effect that has been identified frequently is the 
leaking out of measures justified by anti-terror sentiments into mainstream law 
2 
3 
36 
Cf. C.L. ROSSITER. Constitutional Dictatorship. Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), pp. 3-28, j. FITZPATRICK, Human Rights in 
Crisis. The International System for Protecting Rights During States of Emergency, 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), pp. 19-31; C.j. FRIEDRICH, 
Constitutional Government and Democracy. Theory and Practice in Europe and America, 
(Waltham-Toronto-London: Blaisdell, 1968) (4'h ed.), pp. 563-566; A.L. SVENSSON-
MCCARTHY, The International Law of Human Rights and States of Emergency, (The Hague-
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998), pp. 9-45. 
J.P. LOOF, Mensenrechten en staatsveiligheid: verenigbare grootheden? Opschorting en 
beperking van mensenrechtenbescherming tijdens noodtoestanden en andere situaties die de 
staatsveiligheid bedreigen (Human rights and national security: compatible entities? 
Derogation and restriction of human rights during states of emergency and other situations 
that threaten national security), (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2005), pp. 35-40 and 686; 
ROSSITER (1948), p. 28, states - conferring to Machiavelli: Discourses, J, 34: 'The lessons that 
Rome has taught the world have been many and significant, but none is of more present 
consequence than the pregnant truth imparted by the history of the famed dictatorship: that 
in a free state blessed by a high constitutional morality and led by men of good sense and 
good will, the forms of despotism can be successfully used in time of crisis to preserve and 
advance the cause of liberty.' See also HAMILTON in Federalist Paper No. 70 and j.E. FINN, 
Constitutions in Crisis. Political Violence and the Rule of Law, (Oxford-New York: Oxford 
University Press,1991), pp. 15-16. 
Most recently, this was identified in the Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, 
Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, initiated by the International Commission of Jurists, 
Assessing Damage, Urging Action, Geneva: December 2008, p. 25. See also ROSSITER (1948), 
p. 13 and O. GROSS, "'One More Unto the Breach": The Systematic Failure of Applying the 
European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies', (1998) 23 Yale Journal 
of International Law, pp. 437-440. 
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enforcement: with the passing of time, extraordinary counter-terrorism measures 
have come to be used against drug-traffickers, organized crime and ordinary 
criminals, thus interfering with the human rights of many. 4 
1.2 DEROGATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE POST-9/11 
ERA: WHAT ABOUT THE EUROPEAN SUPERVISION? 
In the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, many States, 
responding to United Nations Security Council resolutions and public anxiety, 
began to adopt an increased array of counter-terrorism measures. While the 
Security Council failed to immediately refer to States' duty to respect human 
rights in their responses to terrorism, it subsequently made it clear in a 2003 
resolution that 'States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism 
must comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular 
international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law'.5 Despite this 
guidance, some government officials and policy makers - most notably in some 
European liberal democracies - claimed that the exposed threat of trans-national 
terrorism was of an unprecedented and exceptional nature and required 
exceptional responses and new standards, including new standards regarding 
the observance of certain basic human rights. As a consequence, measures were 
taken and legislation was enacted of a more repressing nature than that of the 
measures and legislation traditionally used to fight domestic crises or political 
conflicts. 
The relevant and central question of this contribution is whether, given the 
contemporary worldwide threats of terrorism (mainly by Islamic radicals), these 
kinds of counter-terrorism measures can be justified through application of the 
derogation clause of the ECHR. Article 15 serves as a kind of emergency button, 
making it possible for States and governments to switch from an ordinary level 
of human rights protection to a lower, emergency level of protection. It will be 
established that the way in which the European Court of Human Rights is 
supervising whether these governments are really justified in SWitching to an 
emergency level of human rights protection - the test whether there is indeed a 
situation of severe emergency - is flawed and allows derogation for very lengthy 
periods (situations of 'entrenched emergencies'). The additional question will be 
raised whether or not this Strasbourg supervision does create a 'legal grey hole' 
4 
5 
For example, C. WARBRICK, <The Principles of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Response of States to Terrorism', (2002) European Human Rights Law Review, p. 287; 
C. WALKER, 'Intelligence and anti-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom', (2006) 44 
Crime, Law & Social Change, p. 387; R. CHESNEY & J. GOLDSMITH, 'Terrorism and the 
convergence of criminal and military detention models', (2008) 60 Stanford Law Review, 
p.1079. 
UN Security Council Resolution 1456,20 January 2003, para. 6. 
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- a term introduced by the South-African author David Dyzenhaus, indicating a 
legal space in which there are some legal constraints on executive action, but 
ones that are so insubstantial that they still permit the government to do as it 
pleases6 - and therefore does pose a threat to the human rights protection 
throughout Europe. 
To lift a bit of the veil already, my conclusion will be that, theoretically, the 
Strasbourg supervision of derogations causes great concern, but in practice no 
real harm has yet been done. 
2 HISTORY AND CONTENT OF THE DEROGATION 
CLAUSE 
The drafting history of Article 15 ECHR and Article 4 ICCPR, as well as the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the UN Human 
Rights Committee on the derogation clauses are closely connected and 
intertwined. Both drafting history and case law indicate that it is possible for the 
State Parties to derogate from their treaty obligations in a crisis situation that 
threatens the life of the nation. However, this possibility is not intended to serve 
as a loophole for not enforcing human rights in emergency situations. Especially 
the preparatory works to Article 4 ICCPR provide useful evidence of the fact that 
many States protested against the insertion of a derogation clause in the 
Covenant and that after the narrow adoption of a British proposal to do so, the 
main focus of the delegations was on drafting the provision in such a way as to 
minimize the risk of abuse and to make sure that States would be bound by their 
legal obligations in the human rights field, even in armed conflicts and similar 
crisis situations. The ratio legis of the derogation clauses is to offer governments 
the possibility of some further 'controlled restrictions' on the enjoyment of 
human rights in difficult crisis situations, without providing them with a carte 
blanche.? The drafters intended to prevent arbitrary derogations based on the 
dangerous 'doctrine of necessity' by the establishment of an appropriate regime 
for emergencies at the end of the 1940s.8 
Currently, an analysis of the provisions in the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and in the more recent Articles on the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts developed by the International Law 
6 
7 
8 
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D. DYZENHAUS, 'Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal 
Order?', (2006) 27-5 Cardozo Law Review, p. 2018; D. DYZENHAUS, The Constitution of Law. 
Legality in a Time of Emergency, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 42. 
A.L. SVENSSON-McCARTHY, 'Minimum Humanitarian Standards - from Cape Town Towards 
the Future', (1997) 58-59 IC! Review, p. 7. See also Loop (2005) p. 364-375. 
For example, j. ORAA, Human Rights in States of Emergency in International Law, (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1992), p. 228; SVENSSON-McCARTHY (1998), p. 213-217. 
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Commission (hereafter: ILC Articles)9 concerning grounds that may justify 
States' deviation from their treaty obligations - especially Articles 62 and 65 
VCLT on fundamental change of circumstances and ILC Article 25 on necessitylO 
- shows that derogation of human rights is only possible if and to the degree that 
the human rights treaties themselves leave room for it. There is no way to 
'circumvent' the derogation regime offered by the human rights treaties by 
reference to general international law concepts such as fundamental change of 
circumstances or necessity, nor would doing so offer the States additional latitude 
in taking action.ll Furthermore, it has been argued by several authors, inter alia 
by Seiderman,12 that the derogation clauses of the ECHR and the ICCPR in this 
regard are more than mere treaty rules. They can also be considered rules of 
international customary law. This is important because then non -signatory 
parties to the treaties are also bound by these standards. 
Since this contribution is dedicated to the ECtHR's supervision of the 
application of the derogation clause, the following will mainly focus on Article 
15 ECHR. This Article reads: 
1. In time of war or any other public emergency threatening the life of the nation 
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under 
this Convention to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. 
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful 
acts of war, or from articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this 
provision. 
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep 
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which 
it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of 
the Convention are again being fully executed. 
Regarding the conditions and limits that Article 15 ECHR places on the use of 
derogating measures, seven conditions can be distinguished:13 
(1) Proclaiming a state of emergency in which fundamental rights are derogated 
is only allowed in a crisis situation that is so grave that the life of the nation is 
threatened (the principle of exceptional threat). 
9 
10 
11 
12 
I3 
Noted by the United Nations General Assembly and annexed to the General Assembly 
Resolution 56/83 (2002). 
See generally M. AGIus, 'The Invocation of Necessity in International Law', (2009) LVI 
Netherlands International Law Review, p. 95-135. 
LOOF (2005) p. 170-173. 
LD. SEIDERMAN, Hierarchy in International Law: The Human Rights Dimension, (Antwerpen-
Groningen-Oxford: Intersentia-Hart, 2001). 
For example, ORAA (1992); SVENSSON-McCARTHY (1998); LOOF (2005). 
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(2) The state of emergency in which fundamental rights are derogated from must 
be officially proclaimed. 
(3) Emergency measures that derogate fundamental rights are only justified if 
they are strictly necessary and are in reasonable proportion to the purpose 
they serve, such as overcoming the crisis situation (the principle of 
proportionality). 
(4) Emergency measures that derogate fundamental rights may not be taken on 
arbitrary or discriminatory grounds. 
(5) Certain fundamental rights - the non-derogable rights - can never be 
derogated from and may therefore under no circumstance be limited any 
further than is permitted on the basis of the ordinary limitation clause (if 
such a clause is contained in the particular treaty article). 
(6) Derogation of certain fundamental rights may not lead to the violation of 
other obligations under international law by which the State is bound. 
(7) Derogation of certain fundamental rights is only allowed after international 
notification to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe (who will 
inform the other Contracting States). 
For a closer look at the way in which the ECtHR is supervising the application of 
Article 15 by Contracting States, some of these conditions will be explained more 
thoroughly in the following paragraphs. Our main focus will be on the principle 
of exceptional threat, on the principle of proportionality and on non-derogable 
rights. 
3 THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCEPTIONAL THREAT 
Because of the multitude of factors and circumstances that can make a situation 
a 'public emergency threatening the life of the nation', it is very difficult to give a 
more specific interpretation or definition of the principle of exceptional threat. 
The formula 'war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation' 
was specifically chosen during the drafting process to prevent abuse of the power 
to derogate. So far, the European Court and the former European Commission 
on Human Rights (EComHR) have, via their case law, attempted to further 
specify the degree of seriousness which an emergency situation must meet if that 
situation is to be considered a 'public emergency'. 
The first substantive interpretation of Article 15 ECHR was made by the 
Court in Lawless v. Ireland.I4 Confirming the determination by the European 
Commission that Article 15 should be interpreted in the light of its 'natural and 
customary' meaning, the Court defined 'public emergency' as 'an exceptional 
situation of crisis or emergency which afflicts the whole population and 
14 ECtHR, Lawless v. Ireland 1 July 1961 (Appl. no. 332/57). 
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constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the 
community is composed'. This definition was further developed and clarified by 
the Commission in the Greek Case. 15 Reaffirming the basic elements of the 
Court's approach in Lawless v. Ireland, the Commission emphasized that the 
emergency must be actual or at least 'imminent'. In order to constitute an Article 
15 emergency, the Commission held that a 'public emergency' must have the 
following four characteristics: 
- it must be actual or imminent (so it should not be a crisis that could possibly 
occur in the future or is merely perceived by the government); 
its effects must involve the whole nation; 
- the continuance of the organized life of the community must be threatened; 
and 
- the crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal measures or 
restrictions, permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public 
safety, health and order, are plainly inadequate. 
Regarding the second and third criteria, it should be noted that these are 
generally applied in a rather relaxed way. The second criterion does not alter the 
fact that a crisis geographically limited to a part of the country can constitute a 
public emergency under Article 15. Hence, the United Kingdom was permitted 
to derogate from the ECHR, even though disturbances were largely confined to 
Northern Ireland.16 As far as the threat to the organized life of the community is 
concerned, some members of the Commission argued in the Greek Case that 
when the organs of the State are functioning normally, there is no grave threat to 
the life of the nation and, therefore, emergency measures are not legitimate. 
However, the majority in the Commission did not follow this reasoning. 
Thinking on the more precise meaning of both criteria was highly influenced 
by the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Largely based on studies of 
the early Strasbourg case law on Article 15 ECHR by Hartman,17 and drafted by 
a group of 31 distinguished experts in international law convened by the 
International Commission of Jurists in Siracusa (Italy) in Spring 1984, the 
Siracusa Principles determine a threat to the life of the nation as one that affects 
(a) the whole of the population and either the whole or part of the territory of the 
IS 
16 
17 
EComHR, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and The Netherlands v. Greece 19 November 1969, 
(Appl. no. 3321-3323.67 and 3344/67) (The Greek Case). 
For example, ECtHR, Ireland v. UK, 18 January 1978 (Appl. no. 5310171); ECtHR 22 April 
1993, Brannigan and McBride v. UK (Appl. no. 14553/89; 14554/89). 
J.F. HARTMAN, 'Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies', (1981) 
Harvard International Law Journal, pp. 1-52; j.F. HARTMAN, 'Working Paper for the 
Committee of Experts on the Article 4 Derogation Provision', (1985) Human Rights Quarterly, 
pp. 89-131. 
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State, and (b) threatens the physical integrity of the population, the political 
independence or the territorial integrity of the State or the existence or basic 
functioning of institutions indispensable to ensure and protect the well-being of 
the people and the protection of their individual rights and freedoms.18 Hartman 
explains that 'some fundamental element of statehood, such as the functioning 
of the judiciary or legislature or the flow of crucial supplies, must be seriously 
endangered '.19 
In addition to the Siracusa Principles, the International Law Association 
(ILA) has devoted several meetings to the issue. These resulted in the Paris 
Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency (,Paris 
Minimum Standards'), which were approved by the ILA Paris Conference in 
1984.20 As far as the determination of a public emergency is concerned, the Paris 
Minimum Standards essentially contain the same criteria as the Siracusa 
Principles. It can thus be concluded that - at least in the mid-1980s - there was a 
broad consensus among international law experts on the interpretation of (this 
element of) the derogation clauses in the ECHR and the ICCPR. 
4 THE 'NORMALCY-RULE, EMERGENCY-
EXCEPTION' HYPOTHESIS AND 'ENTRENCHED 
EMERGENCIES' 
It must be noted that some experts have pointed to the possibility that, rather 
than serving as restraints, derogation provisions may sometimes serve as 
invitations to increase State repression.21 Additionally it has been argued that 
there is good reas,an to believe that setting a time limit on states of emergency 
has the unintended consequence of encouraging human rights abuse.22 The 
objective of both constitutional derogation provisions with time limits, and 
clauses on derogation in human rights treaties, is securing the temporariness of 
the emergency regime. Hence, the successful functioning of Article 15 is based 
on the premise that Contracting States will derogate from the ECHR only when 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
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Siracusa Principle 39. The Siracusa Principles are reproduced in (1985) Human Rights 
Quarterly, pp. 3-14 and in UN Doe. E/CN.4/1985/4 (1985). 
HARTMAN (1981) p. 16. 
They were published in the (1985) 79 American Journal of International Law, pp. 1072-1082. 
An extensive commentary on the Paris Minimum Standards is given by S.R. CHOWDURY, Rule 
of Law in a State of Emergency, (London: Pinter, 1989). 
C. GROSSMAN, 'States of Emergency: Latin America and the United States', in: D. GREENBERG 
et al (ed.), Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transition in the Contemporary World, (Oxford-
New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); L CAMP KEITH, 'The United Nations International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights 
BehaViour?', (1999) 36 Journal of Peace Research, p. 95. 
L. CAMP KEITH & S.c. POE, 'Are Constitutional State of Emergency Clauses Effective? An 
Empirical Exploration', (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly, pp. 1071-1097. 
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there is a public emergency that meets the required threshold, and the derogation, 
in accordance with the very nature of emergencies, will be a temporary one. An 
emergency regime is in place for a limited period of time in order to retain a 
situation of normalcy. This is what Gross and Ni Aolain call the 'assumption of 
separation': the belief in the ability to separate emergency and crisis from 
normalcy, counter-terrorism measures from ordinary legal rules and norms.23 
Both authors argue that this perspective is mistaken. The central theme of their 
book is that an all-to-common and important aspect of the empirical nature of 
emergencies is their permanence. From this perspective Gross and Ni Aolain 
criticize the emergency regime models of which the ECHR derogation clause is 
an example: the models of accommodation. These models allow for rights 
derogation but put too little pressure on States regarding the retraction of 
derogating measures. 
Looking at the Strasbourg case law, it can be seen that Gross and Ni Aolain 
have a point. Both the European Commission and Court have generally based 
their decisions on the validity of this 'normalcy-rule, emergency-exception' 
hypothesis. However, they have avoided any form of pronouncement on the 
validity of states of emergency declared by Contracting States. And they have 
avoided taking a strong stand on time limits.24 The jurisprudence of the 
EComHR and the ECtHR is unclear when it comes to the temporary nature of a 
state of emergency that derogates fundamental rights. It can be deduced from 
the Commission report on the De Becker v. Belgium case2S that derogating 
emergency measures should end as soon as the crisis circumstances have passed. 
Yet such a pronouncement does not prevent the Strasbourg bodies from being 
prepared to accept the fact of the existence of such crisis circumstances for a long 
period of time and, as a consequence, to also accept a long-lasting derogation of 
fundamental rights. That this readiness exists is especially evident from the 
Strasbourg judgments on the British emergency measures directed at the 
situation in Northern Ireland.26 On the basis of counter terrorism legislation for 
Northern Ireland, an emergency regime that derogated certain human rights 
was in effect for many decades in (parts of) the UK. The fact that this legal 
situation lasted for such a long time did not pose an insurmountable problem for 
either the Commission or the Court.27 Thus, the existence of a state of emergency 
was allowed to exist in the UK for several decades because of the IRA terrorism 
in Northern Ireland. Such a situation is a so-called 'entrenched emergency'. 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
O. GROSS & F. Ni AOLAIN, Law in Times of Crisis. Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), P, 171. 
HARTMAN (1985) pp. 101-102. 
EComHR, De Becker v. Belgium, 8 January 1960 (Appl. no. 214/56), p. 137-138, 
ECtHR, Ireland (18 January 1978); ECtHR, Brannigan and McBride; ECtHR, Marshall v. UK, 
10 July 2001 (Appl. no, 41571/98). See for a detailed analysis of these judgments Loop (2005) 
pp. 402-424. 
Cf GROSS (1998) p. 473. 
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The Strasbourg bodies have never referred to this phenomenon but rather 
have chosen to examine each application on a case-by-case basis, regardless of 
the prevailing country situation. Both the Commission and the Court seemed to 
attach importance to the fact that the British emergency legislation had to be 
prolonged annually by the British government and that, therefore, national 
legislative bodies judged periodically whether the circumstances still warranted 
measures that derogated fundamental rights.28 
However, if Article 15 allows Contracting States to take only such action as is 
'strictly required by the exigencies of the situation', the suspicions of the Court 
should arguably be aroused where exigencies require derogation over a prolonged 
period of time.29 Again, the course of the Court on this point is unclear. In the 
UK situation the Court did not seem to take into account the enduring period of 
emergency in Northern Ireland. However, in the 1996 Aksoy v. Turkey case and 
in some later cases regarding the Turkish notification of derogation, the non-
temporary character of the Turkish emergency legislation and the fact that the 
state of emergency was, therefore, not reassessed by the legislature, played a role 
in the Court's judgment. Although the Court did accept the existence of an 
emergency situation in south-east Turkey and did not reject the invocation of 
Article 15 by the Turkish government as such, the derogating detention measures 
were judged to be not 'strictly required by the exigencies of the situation'. Thus, 
they constituted a violation of both Articles 5 and 15 ECHR.30 
Several authors, including Gross and Ni Aolain,31 are sceptical of the course 
that the ECtHR has taken on the principle of exceptional threat. They argue that 
the ECtHR seems to make an implicit distinction between countries with a 
strong democratic tradition and those without, giving the benefit of the doubt to 
the United Kingdom, while taking a strict hand with countries like Greece and 
Turkey.32 Furthermore, in their view, a thorough review by the ECtHR of 
whether invoking an emergency is justified at all has remained consistently off 
limits. And although they do not consider the ECtHR's supervision over 
derogations meaningless or without effect, they indicate that it generally fails to 
deal with the wider problems that accompany emergencies, namely the tendency 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
44 
This is especially clear in Brannigan and McBride, § 63-65. 
This was one of the arguments of the NGOs that were allowed to stand as amicus curiae before 
the ECtHR in Brannigan and McBride. Cj E. HUGHES, 'Entrenched Emergencies and the 'War 
on Terror': Time to Reform the Derogation Procedure in International Law?', (2007) 20 New 
York International Law Review, pp. 10-1 L 
ECtHR, Aksoy v. Turkey, 26 November 1996 (Appl. no. 21987/93), RJ&D 1996-VI, § 83; ECtHR, 
Demir and others v. Turkey, 23 September 1998 (Appl. no. 21380/93; 21381/93; 21383/93), 
RJ&D 1998-VI, §43-45; ECtHR, Nuray Sen v. Turkey, 17 September 2003 (Appl. no. 41478/98); 
ECtHR, Elci and others v. Turkey, 13 November 2003 (Appl. no. 23145/93 and 25091194), § 174 
and 178. 
GROSS & Ni AOLAiN (2006) pp. 285-286. 
Cf LoOF (2005) pp. 708-709. 
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for emergencies to be prolonged and become permanent and for emergency 
powers to be subsumed into ordinary law.33 
However, it must be noted that at another point the ECtHR seems to have 
taken a clear and unambiguous position. In the cases Sakik and others v. Turkey 
(1997), Sadak v. Turkey (2004) and Yaman v. Turkey (2004) the Court did rule 
that the derogation under Article 15 was inapplicable to the measures imposed 
on the applicants as they had been arrested and detained (and maltreated) in an 
area that was not part of the declared state of emergency region. 34 The 
government, for its part, contended that this should not be a bar to the 
derogation's applicability, since the terrorist campaign which had its nucleus in 
the state of emergency region of south-east Turkey, gave rise to incidents in other 
parts of the Turkish territory as welL The ECtHR, noting that Article 15 permits 
derogations only to 'the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation', 
was of the opinion that it would be working against the object and purpose of 
Article 15 if, when assessing the territorial scope of the derogation concerned, it 
were to extend its effects to a part of Turkish territory not explicitly named in the 
notice of derogation. Therefore, it followed that the derogation in question was 
inapplicable, ratione loci, to the facts of the case and Turkey remained accountable 
under the 'normal' ECHR standards. 
5 THE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY APPLIED BY THE 
EUROPEAN COURT AND ITS ABILITY TO 
ASCERTAIN THE EXISTENCE OF A 'PUBLIC 
EMERGENCY' 
5.1 A WIDE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
A general problem with the four aspects of the principle of exceptional threat 
indicated in paragraph 3 is that although they were formulated fairly strictly by 
the Strasbourg bodies, those same bodies apply a very wide margin of 
appreciation when assessing the question of whether a 'public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation' existed. Due to this wide margin of appreciation 
allowed to national authorities (since the Ireland/United Kingdom judgment), the 
normative clarity and 'sharpness' of the elements of the principle of exceptional 
threat as they were formulated in early Strasbourg jurisprudence (the Lawless 
judgment, the Greek case) have, to a considerable degree, been watered-down. 
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GROSS & Ni AOLAiN (2006) pp. 288-289. 
ECtHR, Sakik and others v. Turkey, 26 November 1997 (App!. no. 23878/94 and others), RJ&D 
1997-VII; ECtHR, Sadak v. Turkey, 8 April 2004 CAppl. no. 25142/94 and 27099/95); ECtHR, 
Abdiilsamet Yaman v. Turkey, 2 November 2004 CAppl. no. 32446/96). 
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In practice, it comes down to the Strasbourg bodies going along, almost 
without comment, with the statements and views regarding the existence of a 
crisis that threatens national security as stated by the government in question, 
when the Strasbourg bodies were under the impression that the government 
acted in good faith. 35 It was precisely due to the lack of good faith on the part of 
the Greek colonel's regime that a wide margin of appreciation was not allowed in 
the Greek case. 
In the first decades of the Strasbourg case law, there may have been reasons 
for the Commission and the Court to show some reserve in sensitive issues like 
national security and combating terrorism. It can be argued that at that time, for 
strategic reasons, in order to prevent the undermining of their authority, the 
Commission and the Court did not issue reports or judgments that could raise 
the risk of States rejecting the jurisdiction of the Court and the right of individual 
applications. When Protocol No. 11 came into force in 1998, the right of 
individual applications and the jurisdiction of the Court became mandatory and, 
therefore, could no longer be revoked separately. One might argue that the 
ECtHR has gained such an authoritative position now that it need no longer fear 
as much the undermining of its authority by one or more governments' critique. 
In relation to other sensitive issues touching on national security, the Court has 
also not hesitated to at times give 'harsh' judgments and find violations of the 
ECHR.36 There do not seem to be any valid reasons for using a less scrutinizing 
test just because the derogation clause is at issue. However, the reactions in the 
British media and politics on the recent judgment in A. and others v. UK,37 in 
which some former suspected terrorists were awarded limited amounts of 
financial compensation for having been administratively detained under a 
regime that violated Article 5 ECHR, indicates that States are very sensitive in 
this field. 38 
5.2 RISKS 
In my opinion, the lack of real clarity regarding the exact content of the principle 
of exceptional threat, due to the wide margin of appreciation offered by the 
ECtHR, poses serious risks for the protection of human rights. In the first place, 
this lack of clarity has led to situations in which Article 15 ECHR was invoked 
and accepted, while it was very doubtful whether, for instance, the requirement 
35 
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This is especially clear in the cases of Brannigan and McBride and Marshall. 
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ECtHR, A. and other v. UK, 19 February 2009 CAppl. no. 3455/05). 
See my case note on this judgment in (2009) 50 European Human Rights Cases. 
Intersentia 
Crisis Situations. Counter Terrorism and Derogation from the ECHR 
that the functioning of the political organs of the State or the judiciary be 
seriously threatened, or the requirement that there was no way for the State to 
protect its security through less drastic means that did not derogate any ECHR 
rights, were met. 
The most explicit example of this is the Brannigan and McBride v. UK 
judgment. In this case the British government relied on a notification of 
derogation - regarding Art. 5(3) and 5(5) ECHR - that seemed not to be the 
result of an increase in terrorist activities in Northern Ireland, but of the earlier 
Brogan judgment of the ECtHR. Although the ECtHR39 took into account the 
problems caused by IRA terrorism on the territory of the UK in the Brogan 
judgment, British detention measures - applied in a period in which no 
notification of derogation was effective - were judged to be in violation of the 
right to habeas corpus and the right arrested persons to be brought 'promptly' 
before a judicial authority. The reaction. of the British government was not to 
adapt the detention measures to bring them into conformity with Art. 5 ECHR, 
but to send a new notice of derogation to the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe. And in Brannigan and McBride v. UK, the ECtHR accepted the existence 
of a public emergency in the period shortly after the Brogan judgment.4o 
In the second place, we can point to the British notification of derogation in 
late 2001. This notification was the result of the fact that immediately after the 
9/11 attacks in the United States the British government managed to have 
legislation passed that again entailed a derogation from the obligations under 
Article 5 ECHR. At that time, the view towards derogations from the ECHR 
became abundantly clear: the British Home Secretary stated on several occasions 
that the derogation of the treaty obligations was only a 'formality' that was 
simply necessary to facilitate the measures in question (unlimited detention of 
foreign terrorist suspects with very limited judicial checks).41 My thesis is that 
the Strasbourg 'stretching' of the principle of exceptional threat by applying a 
wide margin of appreciation paved the way for the ease with which the UK 
government in 2001 used the possibility to derogate from the ECHR. Accepting 
such an attitude towards the application of Article 15 by States might lead to the 
detriment of the level of human rights protection in all of Europe. In situations 
like that of today, with (at least to a certain degree) a European wide threat of 
terrorism by Islamic radicals, many State Parties could be inclined to notify a 
derogation to the ECHR, thus reducing the human rights protection to a crisis 
level for an indefinite period. For, given the fluency of the terrorist networks of 
today and the character of terrorist attacks in recent years, how are we ever to 
know that the threat of terrorism has ended? 
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ECtHR, Brogan and others v. UK, 28 October 1988 (Appl. no. 11209/84), Series A VoI.145-B. 
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After 2001 it remained to be seen how the ECtHR would react to the notice of 
derogation by the British government. Would it accept the post-9Ill threat of 
terrorism as a pUblic emergency under Article lS? The answer was given in the 
A. and others v. UK judgment of 19 February 2009. 
5.3 THE CASE OF A. AND OTHERS V. THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND THE INHERENT LIMITS TO REVIEW 
OF THE ACTUAL EXISTENCE OF A PUBLIC 
EMERGENCY 
The case of A. and others v. UK concerns the application of the British Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCS Act 2001) which was rushed through 
Parliament within a few weeks after 9/11. This Act was a comprehensive effort to 
increase Britain's ability to identify terrorists and to seize the financial assets of 
terrorist organizations. Part 4 of the Act permitted the indefinite detention of 
non-British terrorist suspects without the need to charge or try them for any 
offence.42 It was clear that these measures were not in conformity with the UK's 
obligations under Article 5(1) ECHR, so the UK government issued a notice of 
derogation to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. 
In the earlier notifications of derogation concerning IRA terrorism, the 
British government had always been able to refer to a series of armed attacks, 
bomb campaigns and other cases of violence that had occurred on British 
territory, and a considerable number of casualties on the side of the police and 
other public order authorities as well as among civilians. In this case, the British 
government could only refer to British casualties as a result of the attacks of 
11 September in the US, the resolutions of the UN Security Council which 
obliged governments to act stringently against terrorists and to the presence of 
persons who were a threat to national security, suspected of preparing possible 
attacks on British territory.43 Thus, the factual substantiation of the existence of 
a 'public emergency' in the UK was less strong than it had been in earlier cases. 
In addition, it can be stated that reference to the obligations of the UK in 
accordance with the resolutions of the UN Security Council cannot be considered 
an argument for derogating from the obligations arising from human rights 
treaties, as it is precisely those resolutions that state that measures taken by the 
Member States must be in accordance with the obligations arising from the 
human rights treaties and other relevant provisions of international law. 44 
42 
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Art. 21-23 ATCS Act. De ATCS Act only provided for a very limited form of review by an 
independent tribunal (the Special Immigration Appeals Commission - SIAC) of the ministerial 
decisions certifying individuals as a threat to national security (art. 25-29 ATCS Act). 
The notice of derogation by the UK government is published in (2001) Yearbook ECHR, p. 21. 
R. Talbot, 'The balancing act: counter-terrorism and civil liberties in British anti-terrorism 
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In 2003, Britain's Home Secretary had detained 16 foreign nationals under 
Part 4 of the ATCS Act 2001. Nine of them joined in a procedure before the 
British courts to have the legality of their detention reviewed. In December 2004 
the Law Lords, in an eight-to-one decision, found that Part 4's detention policy 
violated the UK's commitment to the ECHR (on the basis of the Human Rights 
Act 1998).45 The main reasons for this finding were the discriminatory and 
disproportionate nature of the detention measures. Lord Nicholls ofBirkenhead's 
decision said: 'Indefinite imprisonment without charge or trial is anathema in 
any country which observes the rule of law.'46 Lord Nicholls expressed particular 
conceru that the extended powers of detention conferred by the British law 
applied only to non-British citizens. He wrote: 'It is difficult to see how the 
extreme circumstances, which alone would justify such detention, can exist 
when lesser protective steps apparently suffice in the case of British citizens 
suspected of being international terrorists.'47 Furthermore, the Law Lords - as 
part of the proportionality test - expressed serious doubt concerning the 
effectiveness of the detention scheme, since it allowed for the release of suspected 
terrorists in case they leave UK territory immediately: '[This] does not explain 
why a terrorist, if a serious threat to the UK, ceases to be so on the French side of 
the English Channel or elsewhere.'48 
In March 2005, the British parliament replaced Part 4 of the Act with new 
legislation that was designed to comply with the House of Lords' decision. The 
new Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA 2005) no longer allowed individuals 
to be detained in prison indefinitely, and instead permitted the imposition of 
conditions resembling house arrest. In contrast to the ATCS Act, the PTA 2005 
applied to both British and non-British citizens. 
Notwithstanding the judgment of the Law Lords and the subsequent lifting 
of the detention measures, the applicants in the national procedure petitioned to 
the ECtHR in 2005. This resulted in the A. and others v. UK judgment. The 
essence of the ECtHR's approach regarding the arguments given by the 
government for the existence of a public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation can be read in § 177 and 180 ofthe judgment: 
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'177. Before the domestic courts, the Secretary of State adduced evidence to show the 
existence of a threat of serious terrorist attacks planned against the United Kingdom. 
Additional closed evidence was adduced before SIAC. All the national judges 
accepted that the danger was credible (with the exception of Lord Hoffmann, who 
did not consider that it was of a nature to constitute 'a threat to the life of the nation' 
( ... )). Although when the derogation was made no al'Qaeda attack had taken place 
within the territory of the United Kingdom, the Court does not consider that the 
A. and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004J UKHL 56. 
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Ibid. at §44 (opinion of Lord Bingham). 
Intersentia 49 
I J an-Peter Loof 
national authorities can be criticised, in the light of the evidence available to them at 
the time, for fearing that such an attack was 'imminent', in that an atrocity might be 
committed without warning at any time. The requirement of imminence cannot be 
interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking 
measures to deal with it. Moreover, the danger of a terrorist attack was, tragically, 
shown by the bombings and attempted bombings in London in July 2005 to have been 
very real. Since the purpose of Article 15 is to permit States to take derogating 
measures to protect their populations from future risks, the existence of the threat to 
the life of the nation must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which 
were known at the time of the derogation. The Court is not precluded, however, from 
having regard to information which comes to light subsequently ( ... J. 
180. As previously stated, the national authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation 
under Article 15 in assessing whether the life of their nation is threatened by a public 
emergency. While it is striking that the United Kingdom was the only Convention 
State to have lodged a derogation in response to the danger from al'Qaeda, although 
other States were also the subject of threats, the Court accepts that it was for each 
Government, as the guardian of their own people's safety, to. make their own 
assessment on the basis of the facts known to them. Weight must, therefore, attach to 
the judgment of the United Kingdom's executive and Parliament on this question. In 
addition, significant weight must be accorded to the views of the national courts, who 
were better placed to assess the evidence relating to the existence of an emergency.' 
So, what the Court essentially does is to look at whether there are national 
mechanisms to control the application of a derogating emergency regime 
(parliamentary control, judicial review). If these mechanisms are in place, the 
outcome of their deliberations is simply accepted by the Court. 
On the one hand this is unavoidable. In the post-9/11 era it is increasingly 
clear that bright-line distinctions between normalcy and emergency are 
frequently untenable. How can an international court ever assess the imminence 
of terrorist attacks? Information on this will in most cases be in the hands of 
intelligence services and will certainly not be shared with international bodies. 
So, what else can an international court do rather than marginally test the 
existence of national mechanisms that might prevent the unjustified declaration 
of a state of emergency? 
On the other hand, one should keep in mind the fact that these national 
mechanisms cannot function as an effective counterbalance to the government 
that declares this state of emergency. The way in which the A TCS Act was rushed 
through Parliament shows that parliamentary involvement in the decision to 
derogate from the ECHR was highly influenced by political pressure from the 
government. One Parliamentary Committee as much as admitted that no 'hard' 
arguments had been given by the Secretary of State on which the existence of a 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation could be based, but that in 
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the light of all the circumstances the government should be awarded 'the benefit 
of the doubt'.49 In the judicial review procedure, the Law Lords were hesitant to 
accept the existence of a public emergency, but eventually did so because they 
argued that the decision of the legislature in these matters had to be leading. In 
this review procedure British courts were given access to secret intelligence 
documents that further substantiated the imminent threat of terrorist attacks. 
However, a judicial test of the accurateness of such information can only be very 
limited. So, in essence, a public emergency requiring derogation of certain 
human rights exists if the government says that it does and gives some arguments 
that are not clearly unfounded. 
6 SUPERVISION OF DEROGATIONS: A 'LEGAL 
GREY HOLE'? 
Now, it could be argued that the lack of time limits in the ECtHR's case law on 
Article 15 and the wide margin of appreciation offered by the Court to national 
authorities in assessing the existence of a public emergency indicate that the 
ECtHR's supervision actually amounts to a 'legal grey hole'. This term was 
introduced by the Canadian author Dyzenhaus in his book The Constitution of 
Law. Legality in a time ofEmergency.so 
In Dyzenhaus's argument, a grey hole is a legally created black hole, and a 
black hole is a condition of exemption from legal oversight - as when a legislature 
legally authorizes the executive to remove certain people or actions from the 
normal realm of the rule of law. Because it is, in a sense, in accordance with the 
law to create a grey hole through some legislative device, some have seen this as a 
way to maintain the rule of law in times of crisis. So long as the executive does 
not take it upon itself to rule by diktat as a Schmittian sovereign would, in this 
view, rule by law is maintained under crisis legislation. Hence, the stance one 
holds on the question of grey holes reflects one's stance on the question of 
whether rule by law is sufficient to constitute the rule of law, and this allows 
Dyzenhaus to raise a key point: If we are governed in accordance with laws, are 
we thereby in a rule oflaw regime? For Dyzenhaus, the idea of the rule oflaw is 
far more substantive: it 'has content - law is not a mere instrument of the 
powerfuL Rather, it is constituted by values that make government under the 
rule of law worth having.'S! These values, for Dyzenhaus, include individual 
dignity and fair triaP2 From this perspective, Dyzenhaus is highly critical of 
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situations in which the legislature puts in place a legal regime that limits the 
authority of the courts to review decisions by public officials, as was the case with 
the indefinite detention of foreign terrorist suspects under the UK ATCS Act 
2001. Often, in such a situation, the legislature stipulates some degree of fairness, 
but is explicit that no more is appropriate, where the type of decisions 'seem to 
cry out for much more'. 53 Dyzenhaus agrees with other critics that review 
procedures offering only a limited review of the legality of these kinds of 
decisions may be presented as institutions that implement the rule of law, but in 
fact provide a mere cloak for potential abuse of authority. 54 Dyzenhaus considers 
such legal grey holes an even bigger risk than legal black holes (situations in 
which there is no legal review of government actions at all). In a legal black hole 
situation it is at least clear that there is no legal review. A legal grey hole offers 
the suggestion that there is adequate control, while it actually is non-existent. 55 
Translating Dyzenhaus's argument to the ECHR system of human rights 
protection, I would argue that the term 'legal grey hole' can also be used to 
describe situations in which governmental decisions severely limit the enjoyment 
of human rights, but are covered by a veil oflegitimacy (constitutionality/human 
rights conformity) because of the 'OK' given in national or international review 
procedures, while actually these review procedures do not offer an adequate test 
of the legitimacy of the measures. And then the question should be raised 
whether the ECtHR's supervision of derogations indeed constitutes a legal grey 
hole. As far as the principle of exceptional threat is concerned, one might argue 
that this is the case. The difference between this legal grey hole and Dyzenhaus's 
then is the fact that this legal grey hole is not the result of a legislative act (the 
text of Article 15 ECHR) but the result of the deference showed by the ECtHR 
itself (by allowing States a wide margin of appreciation). 
However, the principle of exceptional threat is only one of the conditions that 
Article 15 ECHR places on the use of derogating measures. One of the other 
conditions is that derogating emergency measures are only justified if they are 
strictly necessary and are in reasonable proportion to the purpose they serve: the 
principle of proportionality. 
7 FILLING THE GREY HOLE: THE PRINCIPLE OF 
PROPORTIONALITY AND NON-DEROGABLE 
RIGHTS 
Very briefly summarized, the greatest threat to the protection of human rights 
that occurs when a government seeks to protect State security and combat 
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terrorism comes from (emergency) measures that are not proportional to the 
goals pursued and from methods to tighten security that are fraught with danger, 
such as having citizens tried by special - usually military - courts. In addition, 
respect for human rights comes under a lot of pressure with the apprehension 
and detention of persons that are considered a danger to State security (such as 
suspected terrorists). Such persons run a considerable risk of inhuman treatment, 
or of treatment that does not otherwise comply with international standards. It 
is therefore logical that in the case law on Article 15, the requirement that 
emergency measures that derogate human rights must pass the test that they be 
'strictly required by the exigencies of the situation' plays a central role. In fact, in 
several cases concerning derogating detention measures the ECtHR chooses not 
to delve into the substance of the pertaining 'emergency' situation, but switches 
rapidly to the question whether the emergency measures were proportionate and 
did not violate non -derogable rights. 56 
In applying this proportionality test, the ECtHR has judged inter alia that 
every emergency measure that derogates fundamental rights has to be clearly 
linked to the facts of the crisis situation and has to be in reasonable proportion 
to those facts. This means, for instance, that the intrusiveness of the measures 
has to correspond with the magnitude and gravity of the crisis. It has also judged 
that apart from the norms in the ECHR itself, norms from other parts of 
international law - especially international criminal law - may also be relevant 
in judging the proportionality of measures that derogate fundamental rights. 
Finally, in the international judicial check of the proportionality of the emergency 
measures that derogate fundamental rights, the presence of guarantees against 
abuse at the national level - in the form of checks on the actions of the 
government by the legislature and/or the judiciary - plays an important role. All 
of this makes the ECtHR rather easily accept the existence of a public emergency 
in the sense of Article 15, but is quite firm in its application of the proportionality 
test. In several cases the Court, although accepting the existence of a public 
emergency, has ruled the (derogating) emergency measures disproportionate and 
therefore in violation of the ECHR. This was the case already in the 1978 Ireland 
v. UK judgment, in which methods of interrogation of detainees were judged a 
violation of Article 3 ECHR (inhuman and degrading treatment). The same is 
true for the recent A and others v. UK judgment. 'The Court considered that the 
detention powers that had been applied were not to be seen as immigration 
measures, where a distinction between nationals and non-nationals would be 
legitimate, but instead as concerned with national security. Part 4 of the ACTS 
Act 2001 was designed to avert a real and imminent threat of terrorist attack 
which, according to the evidence, was posed by both nationals and non-nationals. 
According to the Court, 'the choice by the British Government and Parliament 
56 For example, ECtHR, Aksoy; ECtHR, Demir and others; ECtHR, Nuray Sen; ECtHR, Elei and 
others. 
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of an immigration measure to address what was essentially a security issue had 
the result of failing adequately to address the problem, while imposing a 
disproportionate and discriminatory burden of indefinite detention on one 
group of suspected terrorists'.57 It agreed with the earlier judgment of the House 
of Lords that there was no significant difference in the potential adverse impact 
of detention without charge on a national or on a non-national who in practice 
could not leave the country because of fear of torture abroad. In fact, by referring 
to the failure to adequately address the threat of terrorism, the ECtHR seems to 
do something it has not done in earlier cases on Article 15: assess the effectiveness 
of emergency measures as part of the proportionality test. 58 
Especially in regard to the two emergency measures that governments are 
inclined to consider most often when facing a crisis situation: the application of 
prolonged periods of administrative detention (suspension of habeas corpus) and 
the passing of jurisdiction to military courts, the ECtHR has left the Contracting 
States little leeway. In the 1988 Brogan Case the ECtHR judged that - outside a 
public emergency situation in the sense of Article 15 - a detention period of four 
days and six hours before an arrested person was brought before a judge was not 
'prompt' as required by Article 5(3) ECHR. The application of Article 15 ECHR 
(in situations of a public emergency) could prolong this period, but several 
ECtHR judgments show that even in such emergency situations this period may 
not be longer than around seven days. Longer periods of administrative detention 
are consequently judged to be disproportionate derogations from Article 5(3) 
ECHR.59 Also, the trying of civilians before a military court or a special court 
that partly consists of military judges is consistently considered to be in conflict 
with the right to an independent and impartial tribunal (Article 6 ECHR).60 So 
the way in which the ECtHR applies the principle of proportionality under 
Article 15 can function to fill the legal grey hole. 
The most explicit limit to derogating emergency measures is the so-called 
non-derogable rights. One could argue that an emergency measure violating a 
non-derogable right is automatically disproportionate. In this way, the non-
derogable rights place strong and important limits on emergency measures. In 
the first place, the scope of several non-derogable rights mentioned in the second 
paragraph of Article 15 - especially the right to life and the prohibition of torture 
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- is very broad. In the ECtHR's case law, all kinds of negative and positive 
obligations are considered inherent in these rights, including the principle of 
non-refoulement, the obligation to provide detainees with enough food and 
medical aid, the obligation to take adequate precautions to prevent unnecessary 
victims in case of violent action against terrorist organizations, and the obligation 
to perform a careful and transparent investigation at the national level if there 
are complaints about violation of the right to life or the prohibition of torture. 
The 2008 Saadi v. Italy judgment61 - concerning the prohibition of non-
refoulement and the expulsion of a Tunisian man suspected of involvement with 
terrorist organizations - indicates that the Court is not willing to restrict the 
scope of these non-derogable rights as a result of the post-9/11 threats of trans-
national terrorism. In my view, judge Myjer in his concurring opinion to this 
judgment gave the exact right arguments for not doing so. 
8 ARTICLE 15 ECHR: A RELATIVELY SMALL 
PROBLEM 
To sum up the analysis of the paragraphs above: potentially, the ECtHR's 
supervision of derogating emergency measures taken by Contracting States 
contains the risk of creating a legal grey hole. This is mainly because of the wide 
margin of appreciation offered to the States in deciding on the existence of a 
publiC emergency and the lack of an explicit test on the time-limited nature of 
derogations. Because of this, some authors observe a critical lack in appreciation 
of the reality that the ECHR derogation provision neither envisages nor provides 
for such a situation. Given the fact that the post-9/11 threat of terrorism is 
continuous and long-lasting, they call for a reform of the ECHR derogation 
procedure which should include a less deferential approach by the ECtHR to 
States' claims of the existence of a public emergency and fact-finding missions to 
derogating States to make an independent assessment of whether the situation 
constitutes a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.62 Purely 
reasoning from the perspective of the principle of exceptional threat I might 
agree with them.63 However, at the end of paragraph 5 I already indicated the 
difficulties that an international court would have in ascertaining the reality of a 
terrorist threat. Furthermore, the risks posed by the deference on the question of 
the existence of a public emergency are mitigated by the Court's application of 
the proportionality principle under Article 15. Thus, the need for a reformed 
derogation procedure might not be that great. 
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Adding another argument to this, I would like to point to the fact that States 
rarely invoke Article 15; since the 1960s only the UK and Turkey have done so. 
Also, the Article only has been invoked for measures derogating from Article 5 
ECHR (prolonged periods of administrative detention). Article 15 does not seem 
to play a role in cases concerning counter-terrorism measures that limit the 
enjoyment of other ECHR rights. The reason for this is that - outside Articles 5 
and 6 and the non-derogable rights - most other articles of the ECHR in the 
second paragraph contain a particular limitation clause. 
From the ECtHR's case law no clear material limit can be distinguished 
between the limitation and the derogation of a fundamental right. The question 
remains where the infringements permissible under the regular norms and 
limitation clauses do end, and where the infringements only permissible if a State 
invokes Article 15 begin. Actually, the only field in which something can be 
deduced about these matters is the right to liberty and security of person and the 
safeguards regarding detention of individuals. As explained in paragraph 7, it 
becomes clear from the case law concerning the right of detainees to be brought 
promptly before a judge or other judicial authority (Article 5(3) ECHR) that 
under the normal treaty rules, it is required that this takes place within a 
maximum of about four days (see the 1988 Brogan judgment). In case of the 
derogation of this right, detention without having been brought before a 
competent judicial authority can be prolonged for a period of up to seven days or 
perhaps a few more. Especially for rights that are provided with a particular 
limitation clause, it is not clear for which type of interference invocation of the 
derogation clause will be absolutely necessary. With some prudence, it may even 
be argued that invocation of the derogation clause for rights that are provided 
with a particular limitation clause is superfluous. For, in case of a serious crisis 
that threatens the life of the nation, room can already be found (or be claimed by 
the authorities) for further limitations of the fundamental right in question. This 
could be done on the basis of the proportionality test that takes place when 
answering the question whether a certain interference is necessary in a 
democratic society. Reference to a derogation clause would add little to this. The 
meaning of Article 15 is therefore limited to those cases in which those rights are 
concerned that are not provided with a particular limitation clause. Outside the 
cases on Article 5 and prolonged administrative detention, the proportionality 
test applied by the Court under Article 15 seems to result in States being held 
responsible under more or less the same standards that apply in normal 
circumstances. 
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